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I. INTRODUCTION
“Call your lawyer before you give your patient your best care,” was
Planned Parenthood President Nancy Northup’s reaction to Gonzales v.
Carhart, a 2007 Supreme Court decision.1 Carhart represents the first time
in almost thirty years of abortion rulings that the Supreme Court recognized
statutory restrictions on the right to choose and, more importantly, declined
to affirm that preserving a woman’s health is a valid interest worth the
state’s deference.2 Moreover, Carhart reflects a conservative legal and
social movement away from recognizing women’s autonomy under the
law, and toward a paternalistic and protectionist legal approach that fails to
safeguard the preservation of a woman’s health as part of her constitutional
right to personhood. The Court’s failure to recognize women’s autonomy
in the area of reproductive choice turns back the clock on gender equality
to such a degree that it strips Carhart of any real legal validity, and
suggests that the majority was motivated by its personal beliefs alone.
In analyzing the meaning of Carhart, I first plan to discuss abortion’s
history as a legal and social right in America, both in terms of why abortion
procedures arose, and how the Supreme Court has extended legal
protection over women’s access to the procedures. I will argue that the
Supreme Court previously interpreted a woman’s right to protect her health
and to choose what happens to her body as within the right to privacy and
personhood under the Fourteenth Amendment, and that Carhart thus
represents a significant, unwarranted departure from that precedent.
Moreover, I will assert that Carhart creates a very real practical problem
for a woman whose pregnancies present health risks, because the Court’s
reasoning allows states to decide when and how to protect that woman’s
health, removing both the woman and her doctor from the decision-making
process. Taken to its logical conclusion, Carhart diminishes the rights
extended in Roe v. Wade so significantly that it suggests a de facto
overruling of Roe is imminent.

1. John Gibeaut, Ruling Changes Abortion Debate, ABA J. E-REP., Apr. 20, 2007,
http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/a20abort.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2008)
(noting that the Court’s ban on future facial challenges to abortion restrictions would
require pregnant women whose doctors face criminal sanctions to file complaints
against such laws).
2. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1633 (2007) (finding the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act constitutional because the state interests represented—the respect for
the dignity of “the life within the woman” and the “dignity and reputation” of doctors
who perform partial-birth abortions—outweighed the legal need for keeping the far
safer intact dilation and evacuations (“D&E”) procedure).
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II. ABORTION’S LEGAL HISTORY IN AMERICA SUGGESTS THAT, AS
KNOWLEDGE ABOUT ABORTION HAS INCREASED, AND ADVANCES IN
MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY HAVE BEEN MADE, THE LAW’S RECOGNITION OF
A WOMAN’S RIGHT TO PROTECT HER HEALTH AND KNOW BEST WHAT IS
RIGHT FOR HER OWN BODY HAS DECLINED
Despite the commonly held view that women have gained more control
of their reproductive choices over time, the history of abortion regulation in
America suggests that women had more control over their bodies when
science was ignorant about pregnancy.3 Initially, according to historian
Richard Sauer, “abortion was probably not a subject that even entered the
minds of most early Americans.”4 However, as fertility among white,
Protestant families declined at the height of immigration in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the law began to shift in its
treatment of abortion to address fears that immigrants and freed slaves
would begin to outnumber white Protestants and eventually dominate
America’s population.5 It is through this ethnocentric lens that the
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Carhart crystallizes, for without the fear of
“the other,” abortion restrictions may have remained a non-issue in
America.6
A. Pre-Industrial American Abortion Laws Reflected Medical
Misconceptions About Fetal Development That Actually Empowered
Women
Early American abortion laws reflected the medical profession’s lack of
knowledge about pregnancy and how fetal gestation occurs. As a result,
women were the sole experts on the process (and some would argue still
are—an argument lost on the Court).7 The legal profession, taking its cues
3. Richard Sauer, Attitudes to Abortion in America, 1800-1973, 28 POPULATION
STUDIES 1, 53-54 (1974) (noting that “quickening,” the original standard for
determining when a fetus was viable, occurred when a woman said she felt the fetus
stirring within her womb, allowing the pregnant woman to control the alleged time of
quickening and thus the choice of whether to abort the pregnancy).
4. See id. at 53 (finding that the average family consisted of about eight children,
and that only rarely did women engage in abortion, either to protect their health in
high-risk circumstances, or to prevent the societal shame of illegitimate births).
5. Id. at 59.
6. See Evelyn Nakano Glenn, From Servitude to Service Work: Historical
Continuities in the Racial Division of Paid Reproductive Labor, 18 SIGNS 1, 6-8, 10-12
(1992) (revealing that white women subordinated poor, minority, and immigrant
women from the nineteenth through the mid-twentieth century as domestic laborers to
maintain the true womanhood image as that of a white mother, especially at a time
when white birthrates were decreasing).
7. See Brief for Human Rights for Women, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents at **11-12, United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971) (No. 84) (arguing
that there is nothing more demanding upon the body and person of a woman than
pregnancy, and the subsequent feeding and caring of an infant until it reaches maturity
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from women, decided when abortions were appropriate based on
“quickening,” the point at which a woman alone could feel the fetus move
internally.8 The use of quickening as the standard for whether abortion was
legal allowed women, who were relied upon to care for the children, except
in households that could afford outside assistance, to maintain some sense
of autonomy by deciding when to carry out a pregnancy because, as
“covered” individuals, it was doubtful that they otherwise could avoid their
husband’s sexual advances.9
Surprisingly, the law was willing to trust women—white, Protestant
women, that is—to be their own decision makers on this matter, perhaps
also reflecting society’s belief at the time that these women were the source
of “republican motherhood,” and thus their choices always would reflect
what was best for the household and the state.10 Although we do not know
precise abortion rates in pre-industrialized America, the suggestion is that
proper society, including legislators and religious leaders, generally turned
their heads to abortion.11
B. In the Nineteenth Century, States Began to Regulate and Criminalize
Abortions, Subordinating Women’s Control Over Their Bodies and Health
Needs
The era of American industrialization saw a sharp decline in birthrates,
and therefore society’s immediate reaction was to encourage white, nativeborn Protestant women to stay home and, as models of “republican
motherhood,” to have more children.12 As men moved into the industrial
some eighteen years later); see also Judith G. Waxman, Privacy and Reproductive
Rights: Where We’ve Been and Where We’re Going, 68 MONT. L. REV. 299, 315
(2007) (asserting that a woman’s control over her body and her reproductive functions
should be constitutionally protected because it implicates the meaning of personhood
under the Constitution, a right that allows all of us the autonomy and self-determination
to protect and advance ourselves through our individual choices).
8. See Sauer, supra note 3, at 54.
9. See NANCY F. COTT, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD: “WOMEN’S SPHERE” IN NEW
ENGLAND, 1780-1835, 75-76 (1977) (determining that women frequently were
overwhelmed with maintaining the heaven-on-earth standard at home that society
demanded in the world of separate spheres, were forced to marry not for love but to
support the man and, on his demand, bear and raise the number of children he desired,
while getting little personal fulfillment in return).
10. See id. at 87 (suggesting that true womanhood meant women were the ultimate
educators by not only schooling their children before formal education was
commonplace, but also preparing their children to assume sex-based roles, with boys
planning to become leaders in the outside sphere, and girls planning to follow in their
mothers’ footsteps in the sphere of the home); see also Waxman, supra note 7, at 300
(finding that abortions were an option in the nineteenth century exclusively for the
privileged few, not only because they determined the time of quickening, but also
because they had the financial means by which to pay for abortions).
11. See Sauer, supra note 3, at 53.
12. See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT
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workforce, husbands and wives no longer shared household duties as they
had in the past.13 However, because these native women’s interests in
controlling their household burdens became more compelling as families
moved to the less child-friendly cities and husbands moved into the public
sphere, spending hours at work in factories, women began to approach
doctors more frequently for abortion assistance.14
It was mostly women who constituted the sector of the medical
profession that assisted with early abortion methods, and its most notable
professional was a woman named Madame Restell.15 Finding that
married, white, Protestant women were seeking abortions on a regular
basis, and that other women were assisting in performing what abortion
procedures or methods existed at the time, the male-dominated American
Medical Association (“AMA”) felt compelled to lobby against the growing
demand for abortions because the procedures gave too much discretion and
control to women patients and professionals.16 However, prosecutions
against Madame Restell and other female abortion practitioners failed
because at the time, most Americans did not have a moral problem with
abortion, nor was abortion considered a crime.17
Nevertheless, states still chose to restrict abortions because the AMA’s
doctors put legislators on notice that these procedures, like so many others
at this early stage of operative medicine, were dangerous and should not be
entered into lightly.18 Horatio Storer, an early American author who cowrote the book “Criminal Abortions” in 1868, said that state legislatures
did not consider fetal life as an interest needing legal protection, but rather

WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 21, 23-25 (Oxford Univ. Press 2000) (finding that in the
nineteenth century, as the market economy grew in the United States, men ventured out
to be the breadwinners while women were kept home under the premise of becoming
“moral mothers,” who had to remain selfless and put all their energy into satisfying
their husbands and raising children).
13. Id.
14. See Sauer, supra note 3, at 54.
15. See id. (describing Madame Restell as “America’s best-known abortionist” by
1838 who advertised her services in newspapers, providing “abortifacients” that
allegedly induced abortion without injury to the woman, and who claimed to have
served many married women in her time).
16. Id. at 54-55.
17. See Lori J. Kenschaft, Abortion and the Life and Times of “The Most Evil
Woman in New York,” Madame Restell, Speech at the Rutgers University Institute for
Research on Women (May 1990), available at http://www.kenschaft.com/restell.htm
(finding that although Restell was indicted six times for procuring abortions, judges
deemed abortion “a private action” in which they primarily sought to protect patients’
and doctors’ rights).
18. See id. (determining that although New York’s anti-abortion laws in the mid1800s were intended to “protect women,” the law punished guilty women with jail time
and a large fine, failing to consider that childbirth was far more dangerous at the time
than any abortion method).
AND
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sought to preserve only the life and health of the women seeking the
abortions.19 Many early abortion restrictions also grew out of British
common law, which again focused on preserving the woman’s health, by
asking whether prohibiting certain abortion procedures actually caused
greater physical danger to women and made them more of a “physical or
mental wreck” because it forced those women to carry a troubled
pregnancy to term.20
Eventually, states began to apply criminal penalties against abortion
providers and patients under the guise of protectionism, which at least were
narrowly tailored to allow abortions when a woman’s health was at risk,
but still reflected the state’s valuation of “true motherhood” as a stronger
interest than allowing a woman to preserve her health, reinforcing the
emerging separate spheres ideology that came with America’s
industrialization and urbanization.21 Combined with the decline in white
birthrates and the fear that immigrant or minority births would overwhelm
the infant population, politicians could no longer risk allowing unsafe or
medically unnecessary abortion procedures among native, white Protestant
women.22
Ironically, feminists in the nineteenth century did not fight for the right
to choose these procedures or question the subordination theories on which
they were based, largely because from 1850 until the turn of the century,
the birthrates among less desirable immigrant women who did not
represent the “true motherhood” ideal were double the rate of their white,
Protestant counterparts who increasingly sought to lessen their housework
by having fewer children.23
Moreover, early feminists frequently
subordinated minorities to obtain the rights that they sought, for example
scoffing at Congress’s decision to give black men the right to vote before
white women through the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and
trading in their housework to enter the public sphere by purposefully

19. Sauer, supra note 3, at 57.
20. See Criminal Law: Abortion—Preservation of Health as a Justification, 6 U.

CHI. L. REV. 109, 109-10 (1938-39) (discussing the British case of Rex v. Bourne, in
which a doctor was prosecuted for performing an abortion when his patient’s health
was at risk, to support the fact that most American state laws had followed from the
British common law, “generally permit[ting] [abortions] when necessary to save the
life of a mother, and in three states an exception is made for the preservation of a
woman’s health”).
21. See Sauer, supra note 3, at 58 (summarizing that the AMA, the Suffolk District
Medical Society, and the Medical Society of New York agreed with Christian leaders
that abortion was “infant murder” that degraded a woman’s role as mother, and thus
advocated for stronger laws against doctors performing abortions that were not required
to protect a patient’s health).
22. Id. at 59.
23. Id. at 54.
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tracking black and immigrant women into underpaid domestic work.24
C. In the Twentieth Century, Abortion Restrictions Diminished as Public
Support for Women’s Reproductive Choice Rose Through the Advent of
Birth Control and Recognition of the Need to Protect Women’s Health
Although the early women’s movement did not argue for the right to
choose, these women’s efforts to obtain safe, alternative methods to control
pregnancy, largely a result of the modern birth control movement started by
Planned Parenthood founder Margaret Sanger, resulted in the legal shift
toward supporting a woman’s right to control her own body and protect her
own health.25 That shift in thinking forced twentieth-century lawmakers to
confront a growing protest against abortion restrictions at the state level,
with fertility rates continuing to fall through the 1930s.26 Although the
AMA approved of Sanger’s assertion that birth control was less risky and
more acceptable than abortion, women continued having abortions across
the country through the 1950s because the public tacitly favored the
procedure as a method of family planning.27 Even the American Law
Institute (“ALI”) drew up a new abortion model code in 1959 that listed
numerous grounds on which women should be allowed to undergo an
abortion procedure that provided safeguards for a woman’s health in all
circumstances.28
As a result of public pressure, states began to legalize abortion, a
reflection of both the advancing Equal Rights movement and the medical
and legal agreement that it was necessary to protect women’s health by
affording reproductive options.29 Colorado was the first state to permit
24. See ELLEN CAROL DUBOIS, WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS 95-96
(1998) (distinguishing the virtuous and chaste “feminine element” that would come
with empowering white, Protestant women from the “degradation” that feminists said
would occur if black men could continue to vote without the balance of white women
voting); Glenn, supra note 6, at 8-9 (determining that white, Protestant women could
not advance themselves into the public sphere without permanently subordinating
minority and immigrant women into domestic labor roles).
25. See Waxman, supra note 7, at 301-02 (noting that, as a result of birth control’s
advancement as a prescription medication, mostly white, privileged women had access,
though a number of states began distributing it to control the black population, which
resulted in states loosening their abortion restrictions).
26. Sauer, supra note 3, at 60.
27. Id. at 62.
28. See National Right to Life, Abortion History Timeline, http://www.nrlc.org/
abortion/ facts/abortiontimeline.html#1959 (last visited Feb. 11, 2008) [hereinafter
National Right to Life] (listing the ALI’s proposed legal reasons for abortions to
include: (1) rape or incest exceptions; (2) mother’s mental or physical health was at
risk; and (3) fetal deformity, either mental or physical).
29. See Sauer, supra note 3, at 64 (referencing a Gallup poll in 1969, in which
approximately forty percent of Americans approved of abortions for any reason before
the twelfth week of pregnancy, and finding that when re-polled in 1972, forty-six
percent of Americans agreed with the right to abortion on demand).
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abortions, basing its law on ALI’s 1959 Model Code; this provided a
starting point for choice activists, who used loosened restrictions to seek
national legalization of abortion.30
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S INTERPRETATION THROUGHOUT THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY OF REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS CASES TO REQUIRE
THAT THE STATE SAFEGUARD WOMEN’S HEALTH ENDED WITH GONZALES
V. CARHART
The Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade symbolized a long-coming
metamorphosis in public attitudes and legal understandings about abortion
from a secret procedure that women used in order to protect their health
and ensure their freedom from the separate spheres ideology into a personal
right that allowed women to decide what happens to their bodies with their
doctor’s advice and consultation. Just as birth control was in the early
twentieth century, abortion had become a legalized medical procedure that,
like any other, existed for use at the election or need of the patient.
However, state by state, conservatives pressured legislatures to limit a
woman’s right to choose to have an abortion.31 Their movement succeeded
in 2007, when the Supreme Court ruled in Gonzales v. Carhart that the
generalized health exception to abortion restrictions—included in almost
every state’s abortion laws since the early nineteenth century and
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court for the last twenty-three years—no longer
existed.
A. Twentieth Century Supreme Court Decisions Legalized Abortion and
Recognized a Right to Privacy in the Abortion Choice That Ultimately
Reflected the Shared Interest of States, Women, and Doctors in Protecting
a Woman’s Health
In the twentieth century, equal rights activists sought to privatize
abortion in the same way that birth control had been pushed into the private
sphere, with the hope that legislators and courts would give abortion choice
the same deference given to decisions about birth control.32 Those seeking
30. See National Right to Life, supra note 28 (concluding that between 1967 and
1973 when Roe v. Wade legalized abortion nationally, one third of states began
legalizing abortions “on request” up to the twenty-fourth week of pregnancy in order to
protect a mother’s health, including California, Oregon, North Carolina, Hawaii,
Alaska, New York, Washington, and the District of Columbia).
31. See Robin Toner, Abortion Foes See Validation for New Tactic, N.Y. TIMES,
May 22, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/22/washington/22
abortion.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print&oref=slogin (last visited Mar. 25, 2008).
32. See David J. Garrow, Abortion Before and After Roe v. Wade: An Historical
Perspective, 62 ALB. L. REV. 833, 835 (1999) (noting that early efforts to legalize birth
control enhanced the rights of white, wealthy women because they could afford private
doctors to come into the privacy of their homes to dole out the medicines or devices

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2008

9

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 3

396

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 16:3

to legalize abortion pointed to Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court
case in which birth control first was presented as a privacy right, to argue
that the Supreme Court already had recognized the right to control
reproductive choices, citing the need for the law to respect the privacy of
the home and, within it, the married couple.33 Of course, Griswold
reflected the separate spheres ideology in entrusting the reproductive
choice to the man and woman joined, not the woman acting alone.
Nevertheless, for the first time in the modern era, the law authorized
women to have some legal protection for reproductive choice in Griswold
because the Supreme Court read the “various guarantees” in the Bill of
Rights as creating “zones of privacy,” which under a broad interpretation of
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments include protection of individuals’
“sanctity of . . . home and privacies of life,” including the right to be left
alone.34
The Court recognized again the right to privacy to include reproductive
choice when in 1972 it extended the right to choose and use birth control to
unmarried persons in Eisenstadt v. Baird.35 The Court explicitly stated that
married couples should not receive preferential treatment because marriage
is a union of two individuals who still maintain their own values and
opinions, and therefore no cause exists to allow greater governmental
intrusion regarding the choices of unmarried persons.36 After the extension
of the right to make birth control choices to women individually, rights
activists sought the explicit application of the right to privacy to
reproductive choices generally, and this set the stage for Roe v. Wade.
In Roe, the Supreme Court agreed that the Constitution’s personal rights
penumbra permitted women to make a private choice of whether to
terminate a pregnancy by abortion, holding that the choice was unfettered
in the first trimester and then limited later in the pregnancy based on the
doctor’s assessment of fetal viability.37 More importantly, however, the
Court recognized an overriding interest in protecting the woman’s health as
they needed).
33. 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
34. See id. at 484-85 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
The Court concluded that the right to privacy covers not only explicit constitutional
rights, but also the right to protect against “invasion of [one’s] indefeasible right of
personal security, personal liberty and private property.” Id.
35. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (declaring a Massachusetts law prohibiting unmarried
persons from obtaining birth control unconstitutional on the basis that it would violate
equal protection to allow married couples rights to certain medical options but not
allow the same access to unmarried individuals).
36. Id. (defining the right to privacy in the context of reproductive choice as “the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to
bear or beget a child”).
37. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
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an exception to any trimester limits.38 The Court did not convey an
absolute right, but rather suggested that the decision to terminate must be
weighed against the recognized state interests in protecting health, medical
standards, and potential life.39 The Court also said that the state’s interests
did not become compelling until the point at which the fetus could survive
outside the womb, and that using potential life as a compelling interest to
promote abortion restrictions was only applicable where a woman’s health
was not at risk.40
Roe therefore not only protected the privacy of a woman’s right to
choose, but ultimately protected a woman’s health and promoted the sound
public policy of facilitating effective relationships between doctors and
patients regarding reproductive choices.
Moreover, when faced
simultaneously with issues of the state’s interest in fetal viability and the
state’s interest in a woman’s health, the Court named the woman’s health
as a “separate and distinct” interest, and gave the two interests different
weight depending on how far into the pregnancy a woman was considering
having an abortion.41 The Court also spoke against any prohibitions that
would detract from the woman’s health or safety.42
The legacy of Roe was that the Court allowed women and their doctors
to make decisions about the protection of personhood, and treated abortion
ultimately as a private, medical choice, not a public choice that would
subject patients to society’s moral scrutiny and judgment. Choice activists
succeeded by essentially following Sanger’s private sphere model that
made birth control accessible and the choice to use it a private one between
doctors and patients, for which the shared interest among doctors, patients,
and the state was, once again, the patient’s health and safety.
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court reaffirmed Roe by
recognizing its importance in allowing women to participate equally in the
social and economic life of America and by ensuring that women’s liberty
and privacy interests in reproductive choice would continue to be

38. Id. at 153 (deciding that the right to privacy specifically extends to women’s
choice of whether to carry a pregnancy to term, suggesting inter alia that the medical
and psychological harm in forcing a woman to carry a baby to term should require that
she alone decide).
39. Id. at 155.
40. Id. at 163-64.
41. See id. at 162-63.
42. See id. (suggesting that because unborn fetuses are not considered “persons” for
purposes of constitutional protection, courts must always weigh the woman’s health
against a state’s asserted interest in potential life, as women do receive constitutional
protection as persons, and therefore, have an overarching right to protect their own
health and well-being that is compelling throughout the pregnancy, not just in the last
trimester).
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protected.43 More specifically, the Court upheld a provision within
Pennsylvania’s abortion statute requiring abortions to be available in cases
of medical emergency, expanding the state’s interest in protecting a
woman’s health by making that interest the basis on which courts decide
whether a statute restricting abortion is constitutional, regardless of when
viability begins.44 Furthermore, the Court required the state to satisfy strict
scrutiny when it passed a law that placed an “undue burden” on a woman’s
ability to get an abortion during pregnancy, before the fetus becomes
viable.45
Most importantly, Casey ensured that an undue burden included any
health regulations that create substantial obstacles to women seeking
abortions; therefore, a state could not use its long-standing interest in
protecting a woman’s health and safety as a pretext for actually restricting
recognized abortion procedures and thus detract from the state’s interest in
preserving a woman’s health.46 The practical impact of the undue burden
standard was that it forced the states to make a woman’s health the top
priority throughout her pregnancy, allowing a woman to get abortions in
any trimester of pregnancy if her health was at risk.
Reaffirming again that a woman’s health is the determinative factor in
whether a statute restricting abortion is legal, the Court in Stenberg v.
Carhart decided that a Nebraska statute prohibiting partial-birth abortions
violated a woman’s liberty interest in reproductive choice.47 Following
Roe and Casey, the Stenberg Court determined that the statute failed to
meet the undue burden test because Nebraska’s assertion that “a health
exception is ‘never necessary to preserve the health of women’” was not
supported by either stare decisis or by medical knowledge regarding the
different types of abortion procedures that must be available to protect a
woman’s health should her pregnancy take a turn for the worse.48
43. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855-56 (1992)
(plurality opinion).
44. See id. at 860 (finding that post-viability is still the only point at which the
state’s interest in restricting abortions is recognizable, but that the interest in potential
life trumps only nontherapeutic abortions—those that are solely a method of birth
control).
45. Id. at 877 (defining an undue burden as any law that places substantial
obstacles in the path of a woman seeking a pre-viability abortion).
46. Id.
47. 530 U.S. 914, 930 (2000) (applying Roe and its affirmation in Casey, the Court
held that the Nebraska statute that prohibited both options for post-viability partial birth
abortions was unconstitutional because the law requires health exceptions to validate
post-viability abortion restrictions, and the Nebraska statute left too few safe options to
protect the woman’s health).
48. See id. at 938 (determining that where substantial medical authority concludes
that certain procedures must be available to protect a woman’s health and safety, a
statute must bow to that authority, which is an extension of the Casey decision that
more clearly defined the privacy right to protect one’s health found in Roe).
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Although the Nebraska statute had aimed to prohibit only certain types of
procedures, the Court held that the statute’s undue burden arose mainly
because of the overbroad statutory language, which easily could be read as
a de facto ban on all types of late-term abortion procedures.49
B. In Light of the Twentieth Century’s Social and Legal Developments,
Particularly in the Area of Gender Equality, Gonzales v. Carhart Was a
Significant Departure From the Law and Represents a Partial Nullification
of Women’s Rights as Persons in the Constitutional Sense
After the Stenberg decision in 2000, the sum total of the Court’s
precedents favored a woman’s right to protect her health, her liberty
interest in the choice of whether to carry a pregnancy to term, and her right
to privacy in the doctor-patient decision-making process. Precedent also
required that a state have a compelling interest when it places an undue
burden on any of these rights or interests, and that states must maintain a
health exception no matter what procedure or trimester was at issue.
However, the Court’s composition changed after 2000; Chief Justice
Rehnquist passed away and Justice O’Connor retired, leaving two open
seats in a matter of months on the Supreme Court and allowing both to be
filled by President George W. Bush, a conservative who made promises of
a pro-life Court during his campaigns.50
Organizations like the Pro-Life Action League were overjoyed when
Bush nominated Judge John Roberts for Chief Justice who, along with his
wife, has made it a personal goal to end reproductive choice.51 Almost
equally exciting for pro-life conservatives was the nomination of Judge
Samuel Alito from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
suggesting that adding another conservative Justice could signal the end to
abortion options in America, subjecting privacy rights to state legislators’
personal attitudes on abortion that almost entirely focused on protecting
fetal life.52
49. See id. at 939-40, 950 (deciding that Nebraska’s ban was overbroad because,
when compared to other states’ statutes, Nebraska’s ban applied to all dilation and
evacuation (“D & E”) and dilation & extraction (“D & X”) procedures, whereas
Kansas’ law does not ban: (a) suction procedures; (b) suction-aspiration procedures;
and (c) procedures that involve dismemberment before removal from the cervix, i.e., all
versions of the D & E procedure).
50. Katha Pollitt, Roe = Dred, THE NATION, Nov. 1, 2004, available at http://www.
thenation.com/doc/20041101/pollitt (last visited Mar. 23, 2008).
51. See Pro-Life Action League, League Applauds Nomination of John Roberts to
Supreme Court, July 25, 2005, http://www.prolifeaction.org/home/2005/roberts.htm
(last visited Feb. 11, 2008).
52. Darla Sutton, Pro-Life Movement Energized by Alito’s Likely Confirmation,
CBN.com, http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/news/060125f.aspx (last visited Feb. 11,
2008) (reporting that before Justice Alito was confirmed, five states already considered
legislation knowingly contrary to Roe).
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Not surprisingly then, the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Gonzales v.
Carhart ignored the principle of stare decisis53 and, without good reason,
eliminated a woman’s right to protect her health and safety during
pregnancy, no matter the trimester in which she faces complications.54
Moreover, the Court mocked the role that a woman’s mental health plays in
the abortion decision, implying that women are not competent to make
such serious decisions and must be saved from themselves by the state and
the courts.55 Not only did the Court eliminate crucial, long-standing rights
for a significant segment of the population, but went even further in
diminishing a woman’s constitutional personhood as it has been interpreted
since the beginning of women’s collective push for equal treatment under
the law.56
1. Carhart Avoids Analyzing How the State’s Interest in Preserving
Women’s Health Interests, Became Secondary to the State’s Interest in
Preserving Life When a Woman’s Health is At-Risk
The Carhart Court overtly ignored the equal protection interest in a
woman’s right to choose and erased the state’s interest in preserving
women’s health and safety established in Roe and reaffirmed in Casey. In
doing so, Carhart turned the clock back on legal gender equality, relying
upon the ideology of separate spheres to establish a need to protect women
from the seemingly inevitable regret they will endure as a result of their
choices.57
53. See 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1641 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (finding the
majority opinion “alarming” because its rationale does not comport with or reconcile
precedential cases, such as Casey and Stenberg, and because it “blesses a prohibition
with no exception safeguarding a woman’s health,” despite pleas and proof offered by
organizations of medical professionals, including the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists).
54. See id. at 1641-42 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (referencing Ayotte v. Planned
Parenthood of Northern New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 327 (2006), Carhart, and Casey to
reinforce that since Roe, the Court has not approved any abortion regulation that fails to
include an exception for an abortion where it is necessary to protect a woman’s health).
55. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1634 (suggesting that although doctors rarely give
unnecessarily disturbing details about procedures to patients, for late-term abortion
patients it is precisely the “lack of information [concerning the way in which] the fetus
will be killed” that is problematic because if women knew such facts, guilt would
prevent them from agreeing to any late-term procedures).
56. See id. at 1649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (surmising that the Court has resisted
using generalizations about women’s capabilities or presumptions of dependency and
need for protection to determine that now, the Carhart majority bucks social trends as
well as medical and legal authority in taking the most personal of choices out of
women’s hands); see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996);
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 207 (1977).
57. See Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1634 (finding that whether to have an abortion is a
“difficult and painful moral decision,” such that the law needs to protect “the bond of
love a mother has for her child,” and thus the potential regret an abortion may cause,
over the woman’s health).
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a. To Justify Upholding the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, the
Carhart Majority Had to Ignore Legal Precedent for Reproductive
Choice That Treats the Woman’s Health as an Overriding State
Interest for Which an Exception Must Exist to Any Abortion
Regulations
Carhart was decided wrongly because it evades Casey’s mandate
requiring a health exception for women who seek late-term abortion
procedures banned by a legislature, and blurs the Casey line on when the
state’s interest in a woman’s health could prevail over its interest in fetal
life.58 Supreme Court precedent in the area of reproductive rights has been
explicit in its requirement of a health exception whenever a legislature
seeks to limit a woman’s choice of whether to carry out or terminate a
pregnancy, as best explained in Casey.59 Casey’s clarification of Roe—that
the state’s interest in safeguarding a woman’s health cannot be excised by
relying on its interest in protecting fetal life—was upheld in Stenberg,
where the Court deemed the Nebraska ban on late-term partial birth
abortions unconstitutional precisely because Nebraska’s statute lacked a
health exception.60
The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act (“the Act”) that the U.S. Congress
passed then was a starkly biased reaction to Stenberg by conservative
members of Congress.61 Congress wrote the Act to prohibit dilation and
extraction (D & E) procedures unless the doctor “intends to remove the
fetus in pieces from the outset,” drawing a fine distinction absent in the
Nebraska statute in Stenberg by avoiding the language “substantial portion”
in reference to the fetus’ removal, thereby insinuating that it was not
subtracting from the state’s interest in preserving a woman’s health, but
only adding to the state’s interest in protecting fetal life. The Act makes it
appear that the only prohibited D & E procedures are those that would
require delivery of a “living fetus,” and that such a distinction can be made
reliably at the outset of the procedure.
58. Id. at 1650 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (highlighting that the majority focused
almost entirely on the life issue, using “infanticide” as a standard to determine when
and what type of late-term abortions were acceptable to ignore the state’s interest in
preserving a woman’s health).
59. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845-46
(1992).
60. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930 (2000) (finding the Nebraska law
banning D & E procedures unconstitutional because it had no health exception to
preserve the woman’s health and because the ban created such an undue burden for a
woman seeking late-term assistance to terminate risky pregnancies that it left the
woman with no choice but to carry out the pregnancy).
61. See, e.g., 149 CONG. REC. 5731 (2003) (statement of Sen. Santorum) (“We are
here because the Supreme Court defended the indefensible [in Stenberg]”); 148 CONG.
REC. 14273 (2002) (statement of Rep. Linder) (arguing that the Supreme Court cannot
keep Congress from “ban[ning] . . . this horrible practice”).
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It is therefore unsurprising that the Act’s authors relied on testimony
from medical professionals who had never performed abortions but clearly
opposed the practice, concluding, against direct medical authority, that lateterm abortion procedures are never necessary to safeguard a woman’s
health.62 Unfortunately, Carhart uses these serious factual discrepancies to
declare that medical uncertainty exists about whether these procedures ever
help to safeguard a woman’s health, and that Congress’s support for such
uncertainty was enough to conclude that the Act does not create an undue
burden on women’s health.63 Although Stenberg declared that “. . . this
Court has made clear that a State may promote but not endanger a woman’s
health when it regulates the methods of abortion,” the Carhart Court did
just that, extending its weak rationale—that the congressionally-created
“medical uncertainty” was proof that the law posed no undue burden—to
dismiss Stenberg, reasoning that without an undue burden there can be no
“substantial medical authority” supporting the assertion that the Act places
women’s health in danger.64
Carhart essentially and wrongly implies that it is unreasonable for a
woman’s health ever to be a priority over fetal life. Without offering any
real alternatives, the Court simply surmises that a woman would have to
file an as-applied challenge to show that in her particular situation, such a
procedure is absolutely necessary to protect her health.65 However, an asapplied challenge inherently reads like an undue burden, adding an
unnecessary layer of bureaucracy to a decision-making process that the
Court openly admits is emotionally overwhelming, highly personal, and
private. Moreover, such a bureaucratic burden only serves to complicate an
area of law that the Supreme Court worked to clarify for three decades.
62. See Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1644 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (referencing the Act’s
Congressional Record, to which many physicians submitted letters asserting that the
Act’s prohibitions endangered women’s health, and to which nine professional
associations submitted statements arguing for the safety advantages of the banned
intact D & E procedure, to determine that the Act ignored or directly contradicted
medical facts); Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957,
1019 (N.D. Cal. 2004), aff’d sub nom. Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Ashcroft,
435 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that the testimony “was not only unbalanced,
but intentionally polemic” because, of the six physicians who testified in front of
Congress about partial-birth abortions, none had performed abortions and one was not
an obstetrician/gynecologist).
63. See Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1637.
64. See id. at 1638 (believing that because Stenberg requires protection for a
woman’s health and does not allow room for medical uncertainty, it presents a “zero
tolerance policy” that prevents legislatures from imposing reasonable regulations,
suggesting vaguely that alternative procedures exist for women if the Act is upheld).
65. Id. at 1638-39 (finding that women should have to file lawsuits seeking to
reinstate a health exception only in individual cases in which a woman can present
“discrete and well-defined” proof that her health would be at risk without access to
certain late-term abortion procedures, and even then, a woman’s health may not prevail
over the state’s interest in life).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol16/iss3/3

16

Plante: "Protecting" Women's Health: How Gonzales V. Carhart Endangers Wo

2008]

“PROTECTING” WOMEN’S HEALTH

403

b. Carhart’s Language Indicates the Majority’s Preference Toward
Fetal Life and Virtually Eliminates Any Legal Recognition of the
Woman’s Decision-Making Role in Her Own Pregnancy
Carhart includes language and accounts of abortion procedures that bias
toward treating the fetus like a baby—and therefore like a person for
constitutional purposes—and treating the doctors performing these
procedures like heartless hacks, while leaving out the pregnant women’s
interests entirely.66 Launching into four pages describing late-term
abortion procedures, commonly known as intact D & E, where the fetus is
kept “intact” as the terminology suggests, the Court relies primarily on one
nurse’s detailed account of her observations during an intact D & E and
refers to the medical doctor’s presentation as “an abortion doctor’s clinical
description.”67 The nurse’s account uses language to describe the “baby’s
little fingers” having a reflex reaction during the procedure “like a baby
does when he thinks he is going to fall,” and the doctor’s actions as
“suck[ing] the baby’s brains out . . . . [then] thr[owing] the baby in a pan,
along with the placenta and the instruments he had just used.”68
The Court then relies on Congress’s factual findings that a “moral,
medical, and ethical consensus exists that the practice of performing a
partial-birth abortion . . . is a gruesome and inhumane procedure that is
never medically necessary and should be prohibited” to eliminate the
precedential requirements safeguarding a woman’s health and to find
against medical authority that a woman’s health never could be saved
through one of these procedures.69 Congress’s language and the Supreme
Court’s reliance upon it, along with their tacit efforts to make fetuses sound
like persons for constitutional purposes, created the “perfect storm” for an
end-run around the precedents mandating a health exception. The Court
therefore honored the false confusion that Congress created to suggest that
medical evidence rejected these late-term procedures in order to counter the
Eighth Circuit’s opinion, which relied on Stenberg to conclude that,
without a consensus in the medical community against late-term
procedures, legislatures must continue to ensure an exception for the
woman’s health and safety in late-term abortion regulations.70
66. Id. at 1623 (highlighting that “abortion doctors” have a single goal of ensuring
fetal death before it leaves the womb, not to prevent risk to the mother or to protect her
feelings, but to save the staff from seeing any movement of limbs because it makes
them uncomfortable).
67. Id. at 1622.
68. Id. at 1622-23.
69. Id. at 1624.
70. Id. at 1625 (noting that the Eighth Circuit thought there needed to be substantial
medical authority to exclude a health exception because such exclusion placed women
at a greater health risk when medical options were being taken off the table to satiate
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Moreover, rather than relying upon any record that women consistently
regret their decisions or do not give informed consent to these procedures,
the Court focused on a moral argument about the gruesomeness of the
partial birth procedures as the foundation for removing control over
reproductive choices from women’s hands.71 The Court’s assertion that it
knows how best to “protect” women presumably now stands in place of the
state asserting its interest in preserving a woman’s right to choose how
best to protect her own health through private decisions made with the
advice of her doctor.72 In fact, the Court simply writes off the Casey
reaffirmation that abortion restrictions can exist only where the state
includes an exception for women’s health.73
Carhart therefore blazes a new and dangerous path, presenting the
state’s interests in protecting a woman’s health and protecting fetal life as
concurrent interests between which it can choose one to the full exclusion
of the other.74 All the while, the Court never suggests what would happen
to the many women—particularly poor, minority women—who, as a result
of Carhart, are compelled by the state to carry out their pregnancies despite
serious health risks.75

legislators’ moral concerns).
71. See id. at 1633-34 (determining that Congress’s goal in proscribing procedures
that came close to resembling infanticide was proper because it makes the doctor’s
decisions less morally or ethically complicated, and reflects the apparently “selfevident” principle that, presuming a woman regrets her choice even where her health
was at risk and an abortion was medically necessary, she “must struggle with grief
more anguished and sorrow more profound” if she learns only after-the-fact about the
procedure’s details).
72. See id. at 1634 (finding that although doctors may prefer not to describe the
procedures to women in full detail beforehand, if a woman really knew the procedural
details, she would be too mortified to have the procedure, even where medically
necessary or medically advisable).
73. Id. at 1636 (emphasizing the “documented medical disagreement” about
whether women’s health would be safeguarded through a health exception to conclude
that what the Casey Court really meant to say was that legislatures can ban procedures
regardless of such disagreement to protect fetal life, giving no mention of Casey’s
primary focus of ensuring the inclusion of a health exception).
74. Id. (deciding that the only issue it must address is “whether the [Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban] Act furthers the legitimate interest of the Government in protecting the
life of the fetus that may become a child,” and determining that the Casey Court really
intended to begin addressing the previously undervalued state interest in fetal life, but
simply lacked the authority in the questions presented).
75. See Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their
Critical Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815, 823, 83031 (2007).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol16/iss3/3

18

Plante: "Protecting" Women's Health: How Gonzales V. Carhart Endangers Wo

2008]

“PROTECTING” WOMEN’S HEALTH

405

c. The Court’s Erasure of the Compelling Health Interest Therefore
Diminishes Women’s Worth in the Eyes of the Law Solely to That
of Their Procreative Ability
As Justice Blackmun said in Casey, the law “does not compensate
women for their services; instead, it assumes that they owe this duty [to
carry out a pregnancy rather than choose to abort] as a matter of course,”
and such assumptions are what requires us to look at abortion through the
lens of equal protection.76 The Court’s classification of women’s health
interests as secondary to fetal life and subject to massive self-doubt marks a
reversal in gender equality that, inter alia, questions women’s collective
ability to make informed decisions about their individual health
circumstances as well as their other life circumstances.
By reducing women to mere procreative machines, the Carhart decision
defies its own logic by punishing and patronizing all women who engage in
family planning.77 It is particularly ironic in light of the fact that many
women seeking options to protect their health already have other children.78
Moreover, the Court’s concern for human life seems transparent where, as
Justice Ginsburg points out in her dissent, the Act targets what it considers
morally contemptible abortion methods that are necessary to protect a
woman’s health, but actually does nothing to preserve fetal life.79
With moral concern as the primary basis for the Court’s reasoning, all
women could lose decision-making autonomy when it comes to pregnancy
as well as other issues that uniquely affect women in which the state has a
potentially conflicting interest.80 Carhart wrongly inflates Congress’s
76. Id. (informing that the undue burden analysis was developed to ensure that
“abortion regulation not enforce the gender-stereotypical understandings of the separate
spheres tradition,” such as requiring women to give birth because society wants to
maintain true womanhood by forcing women’s choices about their own “sexual and
economic lives” to take a backseat to others’ conceptions of their role in society).
77. See Waxman, supra note 7, at 315 (emphasizing that a woman’s ability to
determine her childbearing plans is a liberty interest under the Constitution of equal
import to the other choices a woman must be free to make, such as “how to pursue her
education and her employment, how to support herself and her family, and how to
participate in the larger world alongside men”).
78. See HEATHER D. BOONSTRA ET AL., ABORTION IN WOMEN’S LIVES 4 (2006),
available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/2006/05/04/AiWL.pdf (last visited Nov.
27, 2007).
79. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1647 (2007) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (finding that the Act fails the majority’s test of “whether the Act furthers
the legitimate interest of the Government in protecting the life of the fetus,” because
nothing in the Act actually protects fetal life, nor does it preserve the equally important
interest in a woman’s health).
80. See id. at 1647-48 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (analogizing Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003), in which the Court held that states cannot punish homosexuals for
sexual interactions with their chosen partners inside the privacy of their homes to
emphasize that the Court already decided that the state cannot use its power “to enforce
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mere suggestion that the medical profession differs on whether women’s
health is at risk by not having access to intact D & E late-term procedures,
while citing to three different district courts that actually agreed that these
procedures had safety advantages, without citing to the contrary any
medical studies showing that such advantages were, as the majority
alleged, “based on speculation.”81 In fact, as Justice Ginsburg points out in
her dissent, many physicians and nine medical professional associations
made statements to Congress “attesting that intact D & E carries
meaningful safety advantages over other methods,” while no other wellknown, large medical associations contradicted the testimony or supported
the Act’s ban on such procedures.82 Ginsburg also points to the expert
testimony given at the trial level in Carhart, wherein medical professionals
offered specific reasons why the intact D & E was far safer than any other
procedure for women with certain medical conditions or certain pregnancyrelated conditions to lessen their chance of injury.83
Furthermore, rather than addressing any statistics about risky
pregnancies and the medical need for these late-term procedures, the Court
ignores the plight of the woman patient altogether. The Court offers only
vague alternatives to the banned procedures, as though they would provide
sufficient safeguards to preserve women’s health, in order to focus its ire
on limiting “abortion doctors” in their practices because giving such
doctors unregulated choice encourages an operational freedom that
supposedly no other doctors have in their practices.84
The Court then essentially overturns the Stenberg rule requiring a health
exception “if substantial medical authority supports the proposition that
banning a particular procedure could endanger women’s health” solely
because it believes that Stenberg gives medical professionals too much
power.85 Without any constitutional reasoning, the Court wrongly
[its moral] views on the whole society through the operation of the criminal law”).
81. Id. at 1635-36 (finding that medical uncertainty exists whether intact D & E
procedures preserve a woman’s health, despite the District Court for the District of
Nebraska and the District Court of the Northern District of California determining that
intact D & E frequently is the safest abortion procedure available to women facing
health risks, and the District Court for the Southern District of New York finding that a
“significant body of medical opinion . . . holds that D & E has safety advantages” for
women whose health is at risk).
82. Id. at 1644 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 1644-45 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (summarizing that doctors find intact
D & E is safer for women with late-term, high-risk pregnancies because it: (1)
minimizes the physician’s invasion of the cervix and uterus, therefore lessening the
possibility of perforation; (2) makes it less likely that fetal tissue remains behind
causing infection, hemorrhage, and infertility; (3) reduces exposure to the sharp bone
fragments resulting from standard D & E; and (4) is a quicker procedure, which in
surgical situations always reduces a patient’s safety risks).
84. Id. at 1636-37.
85. Id. at 1638 (emphasis added) (disregarding Stenberg, because Congress’s
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determines that Congress’s decision to limit what power exists in the
doctor-patient relationship is unreviewable, and that Congress is free, also
without recourse or review, to paint the issue of whether a woman’s health
could be at risk as one of “medical uncertainty” and rely on that baseless
conclusion as a legally valid reason for stripping women of their privacy
and personhood rights.
2. Carhart’s New Limitation on Women’s Rights Has an Especially
Disproportionate Effect on Poor, Minority Women, and Re-subordinates
All Women Seeking Health Options to a Legal Status of Coverture
In its roundabout and largely unsupported reasoning, Carhart certainly
has stripped healthy, informed, affluent women of the ability to protect
their health, particularly when confronted with high-risk pregnancies.86 In
her passionate dissent read from the bench, Justice Ginsburg cites the
Court’s previous rulings that the health exception applies not only where a
woman’s health is at risk because of her pregnancy, but also where
prohibitions leave women with fewer and less safe choices in their medical
procedures when considering abortion.87 As Ginsburg points out, it is often
younger, poorer, and minority women who are not aware that they are
pregnant, who are less likely to know what kind of prenatal care they need,
and who are more likely therefore to have high-risk pregnancies and
require late-term abortions, a fact that the Court has known since the preRoe days.88
Thus, the role that race and poverty play in this issue is substantial.
According to the Guttmacher Institute, the reason poor, minority women
and, in particular, young women of color from poor backgrounds are more
likely to have abortions is because they cannot afford access to
contraception, such as birth control pills.89 These women also tend to have
Commerce Clause power confers a right to regulate the medical profession and to
decide whether such regulations meet the rational basis requirement).
86. See id. at 1642 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (concluding that the women
having late-term abortions often experience fetal abnormalities, fetal health problems,
or their own health problems that often do not surface or develop until later in the
pregnancy); see also Schechtman, Gray, Baty, & Rothman, Decision-Making for
Termination of Pregnancies with Fetal Anomalies: Analysis of 53,000 Pregnancies, 99
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 216, 220-21 (2002).
87. See Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1641-42 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Stenberg
v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 931 (2000); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 79 (1976).
88. See Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1642 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Brief for
the Joint Washington Office for Social Concern et al. as Amici Curiae, United States v.
Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971) (No. 84) (concluding that abortion restrictions do not affect
affluent women who suffer high-risk pregnancies, most of whom are white, because
abortions may easily be obtained with enough money, and thus the degree of legality
finds its measure in the amount of money the women can afford to pay).
89. See BOONSTRA, supra note 78, at 5.
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abortions because the largest factor in their decision-making—whether they
feel they can care for the child at the time of pregnancy—relies greatly on
their income, and many of them already have other children for whom they
also must care.90
The figures are stark: black women are most likely to have abortions,
with Hispanic and Asian women running a close second, and white women
being the least likely group to have abortions, which highlights the
disparities for those who live at the intersection of traditionally
subordinated races and genders, and the role that intersectionality plays in
one’s economic standing and ability to make autonomous life choices.91
Particularly interesting is that most abortions are paid for out-of-pocket,
and most poor, young minority women have late-term abortions because
either they are unaware that they are pregnant until much further along in
the pregnancy due to lack of reproductive education, or because it takes
them too long to raise the necessary funds.92
Because so many poor, minority women experience pregnancy at a
young age, Carhart ensures that their lack of knowledge, which is
exacerbated by their lack of financial resources, will continue the cycle of
preventing future generations of such women from exerting any autonomy
over their lives and therefore the opportunity to advance themselves and
avoid future dependency on the state.93 The main problem with Carhart,
therefore, is that it winds up giving the state ultimate control over which
women can carry pregnancies to term, and which women will have actual
choices regarding their reproductive health. This perpetuates the separate
spheres ideology by pushing women down the path to republican
motherhood and bringing women back under the cover of their husbands
or, alternatively, the state.
As Ginsburg states in her dissent, “[e]liminating or reducing women’s
reproductive choices is manifestly not a means of protecting them.”94 With
Carhart, the Court returns to its separate-spheres thinking of over one-

90. See id. at 8 (noting that most women who have late-term abortions do so
because their “life circumstances have drastically changed” since becoming pregnant,
which includes learning that their health or their fetus’s health is at risk, or having a
marriage or family finances that suffer).
91. Id. at 20.
92. See id. at 29 (asserting that women who have delayed access to abortions and
must take advantage of later-term procedures usually end up in such circumstances
because they must divert funds from “rent, utility bills, food and clothing for
themselves and their children”).
93. Waxman, supra note 7, at 315-16.
94. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1649 n.9 (2007) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (asserting facts from the World Health Organization that restrictions only
encourage women to find less safe means of ending their pregnancies, which often
result in death).
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hundred years ago in Bradwell v. Illinois, in which it determined that it was
protecting women when it held that women should stay home and mother
their children before considering their own aspirations in the public
sphere.95 Furthermore, Carhart also contradicts the modern Court’s
developments on equal protection; as recently as ten years ago, the
Supreme Court decided that most classifications regarding women were
premised on stereotypes that had to be deconstructed to ensure equal
treatment for women as persons under the Constitution.96
Finally, Carhart perpetuates the legacy of slavery for minority women,
particularly poor minority women, allowing the state to continue its control
over their ability to choose how to organize families and when to give
birth. Ginsburg’s allusion to Muller v. Oregon in her Carhart dissent is
well founded; a simple reading of both opinions suggests a parallel between
the Court’s protectionist attitude in preferring the state’s interest in the
well-being of the [white] race in Muller and the Court’s protectionist
attitude in preferring the state’s interest in life in Carhart.97
There is no question, therefore, that the Carhart decision seems
motivated by a subconscious or even conscious concern for white birth
rates, which today are far lower than birthrates among women of color in
America.98 Carhart follows America’s long history of keeping minority
women under the cover of their masters and then the state, starting with
their enslavement.99 Slave women had no rights and could maintain no
95. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141-42 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring)
(finding that women were incapable of protecting themselves, and therefore the state
had to ensure coverture under their husbands because “[m]an is, or should be, woman’s
protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to
the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. [. . .] The
paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of
wife and mother”).
96. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533, 542 n.12 (1996) (holding that
“overbroad generalizations” about women’s “talents, capacities, or preferences” have
made women less than full citizens, and that equal protection guarantees these
classifications receive intermediate scrutiny, thus overturning a rule that kept women
from attending a state-sponsored military college).
97. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S.Ct. 1610, 1649 n.9 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(citing Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422-23 (1908), to assert that the majority
decision to protect women by limiting their rights reflects “discredited” notions about
women’s roles in society, such as in Muller where the Court upheld protectionist
legislation limiting what work women could do and the number of hours they could
work on the basis of their perceived physical abilities and the Court’s decision that
women instead should be at home to mother their children).
98. BRADY E. HAMILTON ET AL., PRELIMINARY BIRTHS FOR 2004, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hestat/prelimbirth04_tables.pdf (last visited Mar. 24,
2008).
99. See Pamela D. Bridgewater, Reconstructing Rationality: Towards a Critical
Economic Theory of Reproduction, 36 EMORY L.J. 1215, 1221 (2007) (finding that a
slave master could rape female slaves without legal or social repercussions, and that
any resulting children became his slaves).
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property—including their own children—and were treated solely as
capsules in which to breed new slaves.100 Carhart is another example of
how the state still uses reproduction as a method of controlling poor,
minority women, whether in failing to safeguard their health as punishment
for getting pregnant unintentionally, or encouraging these women have
birth control medicines implanted in them in return for the state’s
assistance with their current needs, financial or otherwise.101 As long as the
abortion “problem” is infecting “the other”—meaning poor women and
women of color—Carhart suggests that the Court will continue to reflect a
general attitude among conservative public officials that they may
subordinate the needs of poor and minority women to satisfy their own
moral values, the goals of which sometimes carry racial overtones or are
predicated on disparate race and class distinctions.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE, AS DETERMINED BY CARHART
Carhart’s reasoning wrongly restricts women’s rights based on a gender
classification because only women can become pregnant and give birth.
Furthermore, Carhart encourages an overbroad reading and application of
any laws restricting abortion options because it classifies women’s
autonomy and health as a lower interest than other state interests relevant to
the abortion argument. Taken together, these classifications lead to an
equal protection failure because the Court easily could interpret them to
require the abolition of all abortions.
Carhart effectively can and should be overruled by lobbying state
legislatures to de-limit restrictions and require health exceptions, and by
electing officials who support the safeguarding of women’s health.
Legislatures should have to maintain a health exception for women who
suffer from pregnancies that pose a health risk, both as a matter of
preserving women’s constitutional rights as persons, and preserving public
health standards. A health exception also protects existing children if their
mothers would not be able to survive a risky pregnancy because they lack
good health care or simply because of their body’s biological composition.
Because the restrictions Carhart imposes place already-at-risk women in
more dire health and financial situations, the effort to reduce abortions will
put additional pressure on the overburdened public assistance programs and
state entities that already cannot cope with existing problems that poor and

100. See Pamela D. Bridgewater, Reproductive Freedom as Civil Freedom: The
Thirteenth Amendment’s Role in the Struggle for Reproductive Rights, 3 J. GENDER
RACE & JUST. 401, 411-13 (2000) (stating that masters promised to reward slave
women or punish them less severely if they engaged in slave breeding, but would do
the opposite if these women did not comply).
101. Id. at 422-23.
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minority women face. The result will be increased dependency on the
state, making it continually more difficult for poor, minority women—
especially teenage girls—to overcome the legacies of sexual and racial
discrimination endemic to our legal and social systems in America and to
succeed as autonomous individuals outside the cycles of poverty and young
motherhood in which so many young minority women now find
themselves.
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